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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______ 
 
No. 08-3874 
______ 
 
MUHAMMAD SAEED MALIK, 
 
     Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
 
        Respondent 
______ 
 
On Petition for Review from an 
Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Board No. A046-964-203) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Mirlande Tadal 
______ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 23, 2011 
 
Before:  FISHER, HARDIMAN and GREENAWAY, Jr., 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: October 4, 2011) 
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M. Anne Hannigan, Esq. 
777 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 3009 
Chicago, IL  60611 
 
Gopal T. Kukreja, Esq. 
147 West 35th Street, Suite 209 
New York, NY  10001 
 Counsel for Petitioner 
 
Thomas W. Hussey, Esq. 
Daniel I. Smulow, Esq. 
Paul F. Stone, Esq. 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC  20044 
 Counsel for Respondent 
______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Muhammad Saeed Malik seeks review of the decision 
of the Board of Immigrations Appeals (“BIA”) sustaining his 
removability from the United States.  Malik argues the BIA 
erred in affirming the decision of the Immigration Judge 
(“IJ”) that he obtained a visa through a fraudulent marriage 
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and that 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a) did not bar the institution of 
removal proceedings against him.  We will dismiss the 
petition for review. 
I. 
 Malik is a native and citizen of Pakistan who entered 
the United States in April 1999 as a legal permanent resident 
(“LPR”) after receiving an IR-1 immigrant visa based on his 
1996 marriage to Margarita Ramos, a United States citizen.  
Malik and Ramos were divorced in 2000.  In 2005, the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated removal 
proceedings, charging Malik with being removable under 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A), for being inadmissible upon entry, 
and under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), as an alien who 
attempted to procure a visa through fraud. 
 Before the IJ, Malik argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a) 
prohibited institution of removal proceedings against him 
because more than five years had passed since his admission 
to the United States in 1999.  Additionally, he maintained that 
his marriage to Ramos was legitimate.  At the hearing before 
the IJ, Malik, Ramos, Malik‟s brother, and his sister-in-law 
testified that Malik and Ramos married on November 25, 
1996, in Pakistan.  Beyond that, however, their stories 
diverged considerably.  Malik claimed his relationship with 
Ramos began by telephone and letters several months prior to 
her arrival in Pakistan.  Malik testified that Ramos intended to 
marry him when she came to Pakistan, that the couple did 
marry, and that they consummated their marriage.  After 
Ramos returned to the United States a few days later, Malik 
testified that he stayed in contact with her by calling her at his 
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brother‟s house where she stayed at least twice a week.  
Eventually, Malik secured a visa through the U.S. consulate 
in Pakistan, with Ramos as his sponsor, and he arrived in the 
United States.  Shortly thereafter, Ramos informed Malik that 
she was pregnant with another man‟s child and asked for a 
divorce. 
 By contrast, Ramos testified that she traveled to 
Pakistan with Malik‟s sister-in-law to help her babysit.  She 
stated that she and Malik were introduced to each other in 
Pakistan, and that he mentioned marriage a few days before 
she was going to leave.  She decided to marry him because 
she thought they could have a future together.  Ramos, 
however, testified that, after marrying, they did not 
consummate their marriage and that Malik never contacted 
her after she returned to the United States.  Further, she 
denied staying at Malik‟s brother‟s house.  She explained that 
she completed the visa petition for Malik because she wanted 
to be with him, but abandoned her attempts to assist him after 
he did not contact her.  As a result, Ramos started seeing 
another man, became pregnant, and gave birth in September 
1998. 
 The IJ ruled that 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a) did not prevent 
the institution of removal proceedings, and rejected Malik‟s 
version of the events.  The IJ concluded the marriage was 
fraudulent because Malik and Ramos never intended to 
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establish a life together.  The BIA affirmed,
1
 reasoning that 8 
U.S.C. § 1256(a) did not apply to Malik because his status 
was never adjusted to LPR.  Malik filed this timely petition 
for review. 
II. 
 The BIA had jurisdiction pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(b)(3), and we have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a).  We review the BIA‟s disposition and look to the 
IJ‟s ruling only insofar as the BIA defers to it.  Huang v. Att’y 
Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 379 (3d Cir. 2010).  We review the 
BIA‟s legal conclusions de novo.2  Id.  We defer to those 
factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence, 
and will reverse only “if no reasonable fact finder could make 
                                                 
1
 On August 18, 2008, the BIA affirmed the IJ‟s 
decision and rejected Malik‟s statute of limitations argument.  
Following our decision in Garcia v. Attorney General, 553 
F.3d 724 (3d Cir. 2009), which discussed the statute of 
limitations in the context of removal proceedings, we granted 
the Attorney General‟s unopposed motion to remand.  On 
remand, the BIA reaffirmed its prior decision on April 6, 
2010. 
2
 The Attorney General‟s interpretation of the statute 
of limitations in 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a) is not entitled to 
deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  See Bamidele v. INS, 99 
F.3d 557, 561-62 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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that finding on the administrative record.”  Dia v. Ashcroft, 
353 F.3d 228, 249 (3d Cir. 2003). 
III. 
 Malik advances two arguments in support of his 
petition.  First, he asserts that the five year statute of 
limitations in 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a) bars the institution of 
removal proceedings against him.  Second, he maintains he 
did not obtain his visa through fraud because his marriage to 
Ramos was legitimate.  We address each contention in turn. 
A.  Statute of Limitations 
 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a): 
If, at any time within five years after the status 
of a person has been otherwise adjusted under 
the provisions of section 1255 or 1259 of this 
title or any other provision of law to that of an 
alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence, it shall appear to the satisfaction of 
the Attorney General that the person was not in 
fact eligible for such adjustment of status, the 
Attorney General shall rescind the action taken 
granting an adjustment of status to such person 
and cancelling removal in the case of such 
person if that occurred and the person shall 
thereupon be subject to all provisions of this 
chapter to the same extent as if the adjustment 
of status had not been made. 
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Malik claims that the terms “otherwise adjusted under . . . any 
other provision of law” include an alien who was issued an 
immigrant visa through the consular process and admitted to 
the United States as an LPR.  The Attorney General 
acknowledges that Malik was an LPR for more than five 
years prior to the commencement of removal proceedings, but 
maintains that § 1256(a) does not apply because Malik 
obtained his status through the consular process, not through 
an adjustment of status. 
Our resolution of this issue is informed by our 
decisions in Bamidele v. INS, 99 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 1996) and 
Garcia v. Attorney General, 553 F.3d 724 (3d Cir. 2009).  In 
Bamidele, the petitioner‟s status was adjusted to LPR based 
on his marriage to a U.S. citizen.  99 F.3d at 559.  After he 
was charged with being removable more than five years later 
because he obtained the adjustment fraudulently, Bamidele 
claimed that 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a) barred the institution of 
removal proceedings.  The Attorney General agreed § 1256(a) 
proscribed an untimely rescission of an adjustment of status, 
but insisted it did not bar removal proceedings based on fraud 
in obtaining the adjustment of status.  Rejecting this 
argument, we determined that “the running of the limitation 
period bars the rescission of Bamidele‟s permanent resident 
status and, in the absence of the commission of any other 
offense, thereby bars initiation of deportation proceedings[.]”  
Id. at 563. 
 Subsequent to Bamidele, § 1256(a) was amended to 
state that “[n]othing in this subsection shall require the 
Attorney General to rescind the alien‟s status prior to 
commencement of procedures to remove the alien.”  8 U.S.C. 
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§ 1256(a).  In Garcia, an alien residing in the United States 
received an adjustment of status to LPR, asserting that she 
was an unmarried adult child of a U.S. citizen.  553 F.3d at 
726.  Later, DHS instituted removal proceedings when an 
investigation revealed that the woman Garcia claimed to be 
her mother was not, in fact, her mother.  Because eight years 
had passed since Garcia received her adjustment of status, she 
asserted that § 1256(a) barred her removal.  The Attorney 
General responded that the amendment to § 1256(a) permitted 
the institution of removal proceedings against Garcia.  We 
held that the statutory amendment did not impact the 
operation of the five-year time limit to removal proceedings.  
Reaffirming Bamidele, we determined that § 1256(a) 
prohibits the institution of removal proceedings after five 
years based on an alien‟s erroneously granted adjustment of 
status. 
 The import of Garcia and Bamidele is that the time bar 
in § 1256(a) applies to both rescission and removal 
proceedings initiated based on a fraudulent adjustment of 
status.  These decisions, however, are distinguishable from 
Malik‟s situation in a significant aspect:  Malik never 
received an adjustment of status.  Rather, he obtained his LPR 
status by receiving an immigrant visa through the consular 
process.  Historically, “immigrant status was predicated upon 
the issuance of an immigrant visa, which could be obtained 
only at U.S. consular offices abroad.”  Landin-Molina v. 
Holder, 580 F.3d 913, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2009).  With the 
enactment of 8 U.S.C. § 1255, however, Congress 
“authorized a process – „adjustment of status‟ – whereby 
certain aliens physically present in the United States could 
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seek lawful permanent resident status without having to 
depart this country.”  Id. at 916.  In this regard, there are two 
distinct paths for an alien to obtain LPR status:  (1) through 
consular processing, 8 U.S.C. § 1201(a); and (2) through an 
adjustment of status, 8 U.S.C. § 1255. 
“The plain language of the statute is the „starting place 
in our inquiry.‟”  United States v. Introcaso, 506 F.3d 260, 
264 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 
600, 605 (1994)).  Section 1256(a) speaks of the Attorney 
General‟s responsibility to take action on an erroneously 
granted adjustment within five years if “the status of a person 
has been otherwise adjusted under . . . any other provision of 
law to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence.”  8 U.S.C. § 1256(a) (emphasis added).  Malik did 
not obtain an adjustment of status to become an LPR.  
Instead, he derived his LPR status through the process 
described in 8 U.S.C. § 1201.  Because § 1256(a) explicitly 
discusses “adjustment of status,” the statute of limitations 
does not apply to the  institution of removal proceedings 
where Malik did not obtain his LPR status in this manner.  
Given that there is nothing in the statute to suggest its 
applicability to proceedings against an alien who never 
adjusted his status, Malik‟s argument fails. 
B.  Whether the Marriage was Fraudulent 
 Second, Malik argues that the BIA erred in affirming 
the IJ‟s decision that he entered into a fraudulent marriage.  
An alien bears the burden to establish that the marriage “was 
not contracted for the purpose of evading any provisions of 
the immigration laws.”  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(G)(i).  When 
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determining whether a marriage is fraudulent, we consider 
whether the parties intended to establish a life together at the 
time of marriage.  See, e.g., Rodriguez v. INS, 204 F.3d 25, 27 
(1st Cir. 2000); Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 
1975); In re Soriano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 764, 765 (BIA 1988).  
Post-marriage conduct may be relevant to resolving this issue, 
insofar as it reveals the couple‟s state of mind at the time they 
married.  See Rodriguez, 204 F.3d at 27; Bark, 511 F.2d at 
1202.  In reviewing the BIA‟s affirmance of the IJ‟s decision, 
we examine whether there was substantial evidence to sustain 
the conclusion that Malik and Ramos did not intend to 
establish a life together.  Dia, 353 F.3d at 249. 
 We determine that substantial evidence supports the 
finding that Malik and Ramos did not so intend.  Even though 
Malik and Ramos testified that they wanted to have a future 
together, the IJ permissibly concluded that their post-marriage 
conduct belied that assertion.  The parties‟ testimony 
conflicted on many crucial aspects.  Ramos testified that 
Malik never contacted her after she returned to the United 
States.  Conversely, Malik asserted that he communicated 
with Ramos through letters and phone calls to his brother‟s 
house.  Malik‟s brother and sister-in-law corroborated this 
testimony.  Nevertheless, the IJ credited Ramos‟ testimony 
because it found it problematic that Ramos was pregnant and 
gave birth without Malik‟s brother or sister-in-law noticing, 
given that she was supposedly in frequent contact with them.  
Although Malik‟s brother and sister-in-law explained that 
they were unaware of Ramos‟ pregnancy because she was 
heavy set, they also admitted she was not so overweight that a 
pregnancy would have been unnoticeable.  To this end, the IJ 
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concluded that Ramos never stayed with Malik‟s brother, 
Malik did not contact Ramos during their separation, and the 
lack of communication demonstrated that the couple did not 
intend to establish a life together.  The IJ‟s determination was 
reasonable because it would have been difficult for Ramos to 
have stayed with Malik‟s brother for two nights per week and 
have her pregnancy and subsequent birth go undetected.  As 
such, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the 
marriage between Malik and Ramos was fraudulent.  Id. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for 
review. 
